Wartime globalization in Asia, 1937 Asia, -1945 review, labels the 'most direct form of "global connection" imaginable' -that is, 'military conquest '. 8 Students coming to the history of nineteenth and twentieth century globalization might therefore be forgiven for imagining that it was in fact what happened before and in between major international conflicts -that globalization was a process historically bookended by these conflicts; and confined to periods of, by comparison, relative 'capitalist peace', until the moment when it sprang forth rejuvenated following the thawing of the Cold War. Alternatively, from their reading of A World Connecting, the recent mammoth volume of which Bell has been critical, these same students might adduce, as he puts it, that 'even the World Wars actually did surprisingly little to disrupt the long-term growth of global connections and networking' 9 -that, in effect, the onward forces of globalization carried on regardless in spite of such cataclysmic disruption.
10
The articles presented here, all of which focus on the globalizing impact of the [1937] [1938] [1939] [1940] [1941] [1942] [1943] [1944] [1945] conflict in Asia, do not pursue this latter thesis. All our contributors implicitly recognize the Studies, vol. 47, no. 6, 2013 Studies, vol. 47, no. 6, , pp. 1782 Studies, vol. 47, no. 6, -1811 ; H. Streets-Salter, 'The local was global: the Singapore Mutiny of 1915 '. Journal of World History, vol. 24, no. 3, 2013, pp. 539-576 . Empire and Nation, 1937 -1945 , Brill, Leiden, 2013 . See also C. well have also developed had the war in the Pacific not turned against the Japanese from late 1942, the scope of Ruoff's study is determined by the reality that it did.
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The problems arise when these frames of reference become confining conceptual compartments, which limit our understanding of wartime forces and mechanisms. If any historical event in the history of Asia brought home the reality that life (and death) in one part of the region had becaome linked to places elsewhere and far away, then the war of [1937] [1938] [1939] [1940] [1941] [1942] [1943] [1944] [1945] was undoubtedly it. For historians to avoid the study of the global interconnections which this conflict produced, because they lure the nation-state or the area studies specialists among them over the border into an alien country, means losing sight of those key transnational actors, those (often newly-formed) supranational contexts, and those intense border-crossing movements and interdependencies which arose from the war and determined the way it unfolded. A narrower historical lens might ensure that the story remains clear and focused. It will still only hint at the myriad ways in which the same story's protagonists fought, imagined, experienced, and determined the outcome of this conflict beyond the geographical boundaries that it so readily altered or obliterated.
That being said, this forum does not seek to make a sacrificial offering of the local, the national or 'the area' at the altar of the pan-Asian and the global. It is hardly its intention to inspire historians to ditch their conceptual baggage and their robes of specialist expertise, so that they can run headlong and unencumbered after wartime connections which take them ever further away from the place where they started. The global frame employed here is not one that aspires to provide global coverage. Rather, we take as our starting point the study of globalization as involving the investigation of transnational phenomena that manifest themselves in 'the movement of people, goods, and knowledge beyond the boundaries of collectives, as defined by their political or ethnic affiliation'. 22 We furthermore seek to make the (one might say obvious) case that wartime processes that impacted in Asia were 'constructed in [this very] movement between places, sites, and regions.'
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Most importantly, this forum attempts to provide a rooted understanding of border-crossing wartime connections in which a global perspective is drawn upon to better inform our understanding of place, whether that place be 'the area' of area studies approaches, the nation or the locality. To this end, the articles collected here adopt what might be considered a decidedly non-macro approach to wartime globalization. Each is grounded in the study of a single incident, a single life-story or group of connected life-stories, or a single space, be it a city or nation: the Indian war correspondent who travelled along the 'great crescent' from India down to Java; the female Chinese intellectuals who converged on the suddenly internationalized cities of Wuhan and Chongqing; the Indian medical mission to war-torn China; the national response in the Philippines to the complex transnational ideology of Japanese pan-Asianism; and, finally, the impact of an Italian propaganda mission, with its pageantry of global fascism, on the Japanese home front and on Japan's status internationally.
In all of these studies a global frame means taking the wartime history of the modern-day Asian nation-state out of itself -whether that nation be (in our case) India, China, the Philippines or Japan -in order to then return it to itself, with what is hoped is an enhanced understanding of the way wartime convergences and connections impacted upon it. Indeed, as many of these articles affirm, wartime globalization was a critical historical process which 22 This follows Osterhammel's conceptualisation of transnational history. For the German original, see J.
Osterhammel, 'Globalgeschichte', in Geschichte: ein Grundkurs, H.-J. Goertz (ed), 3 rd rev. ed., Rowohlt, Reinbek, 2007, p. 596. shaped the future of nascent modern Asian nation-states, a process that could serve ultimately to strengthen rather than weaken them.
The contributions
In In other cases, the transnational mobilities which the war unleashed came to a swift and even grinding halt once hostilities had formally ceased. Pan-Asian concepts and sentiments that were put to the test in the Philippines, for example, and which had faltered even before Japan's surrender message rang through the archipelago, did not survive much after 1945. The globallyexpansive geo-political spaces that the war had opened up for women intellectuals in China shrank shortly thereafter as well, as China's Civil War and then the 1949 Communist
Revolution decimated participation in these formerly inclusive patriotic networks and severed their overseas links.
Finally, if we take a step back, and at last adopt a macro-perspective, we find that the ways in which the war in Asia enabled and forced certain historical actors to globalize their activities were contingent on the direction in which the world, in far off other parts, was at the same time being steered (and more often pushed). For example, the way World War Two unfolded in the region was heavily determined by the arrival, the retreat, the return, and then the final departure 
